India’s Nuclear Policy
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.61841/6kaqg696Keywords:
Non-proliferation,, India,, United States,, Nuclear,, StrategicAbstract
Nuclear cooperation has brought a new dimension to India’s diplomacy in the 21st century. India’s status as a responsible nuclear power is predicated upon the civil relationships in the nuclear domain that it has established with major powers. This, despite not being a signatory to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and operating outside the ambit of the Nuclear Suppliers Group. This brief analyses the impact of key agreements with different countries on India’s engagements on the bilateral and multilateral level. It looks into the challenges facing the country in the implementation of these agreements and outlines the way forward for similar accords in the future.
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References
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2. Though a decade old, Perkovich’s work is still the best history of the Indian nuclear programme. George Perkovich, India’s Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1999). See also, Raj Chengappa, Weapons of Peace: The Secret Story of India’s Quest to be A Nuclear Power (New Delhi: Harper Collins, 2000); Abraham, The Making of the Indian Atomic Bomb; and Bharat Karnad, Nuclear Weapons and Indian Security: The Realist Foundations of Strategy, 2nd ed. (New Delhi: Macmillan, 2005).
3. Ashley Tellis, India’s Emerging Nuclear Posture: Between Recessed Deterrent and Ready Arsenal (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2001).
4. Waheguru Pal Singh Sidhu, The Evolution of India’s Nuclear Doctrine (New Delhi: Centre for Policy Research Occasional Paper no. 9, 2004).
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23. For a detailed analysis, see Ashley J. Tellis, Atoms for War?: U.S.– Indian Civilian Nuclear Cooperation and India’s Nuclear Arsenal (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for InternationalPeace, 2006).
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