Hybrid Mismatch Arrangement: Does it endanger tax base?

Authors

  • Ferry Irawan Senior lecturer at Tax Department, Polytechnic of State Finance STAN, Indonesia. Author
  • Hanik Susilawati Muamarah Senior lecturer at Tax Department, Polytechnic of State Finance STAN, Indonesia. Author
  • Dina Faqih Hastuti Saff at Directorate General of Taxes, Indonesia Author

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.61841/bqvsh861

Keywords:

hybrid mismatch arrangement, Indonesia state-owned enterprise

Abstract

Base erosion and profit shifting (BEPS) action plans issued by OECD and supported by G-20 have been partially adopted by Indonesia Tax Authority (ITA). So far, Indonesia has established regulation which addressed the Action Plans. There are various ways to avoid the tax. One of the common practice is hybrid mismatch arrangement. A group of companies can obtain benefits from this transaction by making use of tax regulation in different countries. The objective of this study is to elaborate how hybrid mismatch arrangement applied and why the tax authority concern about it. This study use case-study method. We analyze a state-owned enterprises case that applied hybrid mismatch arrangement. Thus, we found several decisive results. First, Company used hybrid mismatch arrangement scheme to shift profit abroad which implied to less tax payment in Indonesia. Second, the dispute is brought to the tax court and transfer pricing became the settlement of the scheme. This is happened because Indonesia faced legal basis to treat the scheme as a hybrid mismatch arrangement. These findings may give recommendation to Indonesia Tax Authority to establish the relevant rules.

 

Downloads

Download data is not yet available.

References

) Alvarez-Martínez, María T. et al. (2018) : How Large is the Corporate Tax Base Erosion and Profit Shifting? A General Equlibrium Approach, CESifo Working Paper, No. 6870, Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich.

[2) Beuselinck, C., & Deloof, M. (2014). Earnings Management in Business Groups: Tax Incentives or Expropriation Concealment? The International Journal of Accounting, 49(1), 27–52. doi:10.1016/j.intacc.2014.01.008.

[3) Bartelsman, E. J., & Beetsma, R. M. W. J. (2003). Why pay more? Corporate tax avoidance through transfer pricing in OECD countries. Journal of Public Economics, 87(9-10), 2225–2252. doi:10.1016/s0047- 2727(02)00018-x

[4] Brauner, Y. (2014). What the BEPS. Fla. Tax Rev., 16, 55.

[5] Connelly, B. L., Certo, S. T., Ireland, R. D., & Reutzel, C. R. (2010). Signaling Theory: A Review and Assessment. Journal of Management, 37(1), 39–67. doi:10.1177/0149206310388419.

[6] Dietsch, P., & Rixen, T. (2014). Tax competition and global background justice. Journal of political philosophy, 22(2), 150-177.

[7] Halim, A. Z., How, J., & Verhoeven, P. (2017). Agency costs and corporate sukuk issuance. Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, 42, 83–95. doi:10.1016/j.pacfin.2016.05.014

[8] Hoopes, J. L., Mescall, D., & Pittman, J. A. (2012). Do IRS Audits Deter Corporate Tax Avoidance? The Accounting Review, 87(5), 1603–1639. doi:10.2308/accr-50187

[9] Jensen, M. C., & Meckling, W. H. (1976). Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics, 3(4), 305–360. doi:10.1016/0304-405x(76)90026-x

[10] Lanis, R., Richardson, G., Liu, C., & McClure, R. (2018). The Impact of Corporate Tax Avoidance on Board of Directors and CEO Reputation. Journal of Business Ethics. doi:10.1007/s10551-018-3949-4.

[11] Rita Barrera & Jessica Bustamante (2017): The Rotten Apple: Tax Avoidance in Ireland, The International Trade Journal, DOI: 10.1080/08853908.2017.1356250

[12] Ross, S. A. (1973). The economic theory of agency: The principal's problem. The American Economic Review, 63(2), 134-139.

[13] Ross, L. (1977). The Intuitive Psychologist And His Shortcomings: Distortions in the Attribution Process1. In

Advances in experimental social psychology (Vol. 10, pp. 173-220). Academic Press.

[14] Scott, J. H. (1976). A Theory of Optimal Capital Structure. The Bell Journal of Economics, 7(1), 33. doi:10.2307/3003189

[15] Spence, M. (1973). Job Market Signaling," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 87 (3), 355-74.(1977). Consumer Misperceptions, Product Failure and Producer Liability,” Review ofEconomic Studies, 44(3).

[16] Tambunan, Anggi P.I. 2016. BEPS Action 2: Menetralisasi Hybrid Mismatch Arrangement. Inside Tax Magazine edisi 38: 26-30. https://www.globalpolicy.org/globalization/defining-globalization.html retrieved

July 4th 2019.

Downloads

Published

30.11.2020

How to Cite

Irawan, F., Muamarah, H. S., & Hastuti, D. F. (2020). Hybrid Mismatch Arrangement: Does it endanger tax base?. International Journal of Psychosocial Rehabilitation, 24(9), 143-158. https://doi.org/10.61841/bqvsh861