

Corruption Typology in Direct Regional Head Election

¹Sitti Aminah, ²Hari Sutanto, ³Gunawan, ⁴Deden Nuryadin, ⁵Amsal

Abstract-- High cost politic in the direct regional head election (Pilkada) is one of the factors causing regional official corruption. The study aims to describe corruption during Pilkada and the lessons learned to improve future Pilkada. This study was used qualitative methods. The data collected through focus group discussions, literature studies and legislation analysis. The results of study shows that the typology of corruption involving interaction between actors during pilkada, including: (1) interaction between political leaders and regional bureaucrats; (2) interaction between regional government head as incumbents and political party elites; (3) interaction between regional government head candidates and the legislature and (4) interaction between regional government head candidates and informal leaders. Lessons learned are the need to strengthen political parties such us recruitment and regeneration of leaders; optimization of the functions and roles of electoral institutions, such as regional election commission (KPUD) and regional election supervisory agency (Bawaslu); political education for the community, increased election budget control, and effectiveness of the security budget. The study recommendations cover aspects of reforming legislation, reforming institutions and improving the political culture of the community.

Keywords: corruption, direct regional head government election, typology.

I. INTRODUCTION

Corruption is an alarming phenomenon in the current Indonesian government. According to 2014-2018 Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) data, there has been an increase in corruption in government institutions such as Ministries, Institutions, Regional Governments, House of Representatives (DPR) and Regional House of Representatives (DPRD). However, corruption in regional government shows a very significant increase. Figure 1 shows the increase in corruption in the Provincial Government, in 2014 there were 11 cases of corruption, increased to 18 cases in 2015, and three years later increased to 29 cases in 2018. This means that out of 34 provinces in Indonesia, more than 85 percent of provincial officials are involved in corruption cases. In the District / City Government, corruption cases committed by regional officials reached 19 cases in 2014 and 10 cases in 2015, then increased sharply in 2016 and 2017 from 15 to 53 cases, then increased to 114 cases in 2018. The amount of Regency / City corruption increased by more than 50 percent in 2018.

¹ Sitti Aminah, Research and Development Agency, Ministry of Home Affairs, Indonesia, Email: sitti Aminah.kemendagri@gmail.com

² Hari Sutanto, Research and Development Agency, Ministry of Home Affairs, Indonesia

³ Gunawan, Research and Development Agency, Ministry of Home Affairs, Indonesia

⁴ Deden Nuryadin, Research and Development Agency, Ministry of Home Affairs, Indonesia

⁵ Amsal, Research and Development Agency, Ministry of Home Affairs, Indonesia




Figure 1. The 2014-2018 Corruption Crime Case handled by the KPK (data processed)
 Source: <https://acch.kpk.go.id/> accessed 22 February 2020

Direct regional head elections (Pilkada) are thought to contribute to the high level of corruption in the regions. High cost politic is one of the factors causing regional officials "forced" to commit corruption. Referring to the KPK data, there were 17 cases of corruption committed by the Governor and there were 60 cases of corruption of Regents / Mayors handled by the KPK in 2017. At the legislative level, there are 129 DPR and DPRD members involved in corruption and are being handled by the KPK. Moreover, in Malang there are 41 DPRD members out of 45 who have become suspects in corruption cases. This situation, practically paralyzing the legislative function that harm regional communities.

Table 1. Corruption Cases of Regional Head and DPR / DPRD handled by KPK 2004-2017 Period

No	Position	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	Total
1.	Governor	1	-	2	1	1	2	1	-	-	2	3	3	1	0	17
2.	Mayor / Regent and Deputy	-	-	3	6	6	5	4	3	3	3	12	4	9	2	60
3.	DPR and DPRD members	-	-	-	2	7	8	27	5	16	8	9	19	23	5	129
TOTAL		1	0	5	9	14	15	32	8	19	13	24	26	33	7	206

Source: Agus Rahardjo, Indonesia Development Forum, August 9-10th, 2017)

Corruption can hamper the realization of state objectives, damage the foundations of democracy, rule of law and violations of human rights, distort the economy and reduce the quality of life of society, as well as to threaten security stability (Koffi A. Annan in Pradiptyo et. Al, 2015) [1]. Experts suggest the negative impact of corruption on the country's economy, including corruption can inhibit economic growth Mauro (1995) [2] also inhibit the

investment climate (Mauro, 1998) [3]. Corruption also inhibits the entry of investment, because investors from countries with low levels of corruption tend to choose to block investments from countries that share a low level of corruption. On the investor side, countries with high levels of corruption tend to choose investment in countries with high corruption (Cuervo Cazorra, 2006) [4]. The implication is that when a country's people allow corruption to develop in their country, at the same time they invite foreign investors who are accustomed to corruption (bribing, embezzling and gratification) to operate in the country.

Before describing the typology of corruption, it is necessary to define what is meant by corruption. Cambridge Advanced Learner's Dictionary (2003) [5] defines corruption as illegal, immoral or dishonest behavior, especially by people in positions of power. Many experts put forward the definition of corruption (see Rose-Ackerman, 1974 [6]; World Bank (1997) [7]; Klitgaard, 1998 [8] Jain, 2001 [9], Chang, 2013 [10]). World Bank (1997) defines corruption as the behavior of officials, both politicians and civil servants who enrich themselves improperly and against the law. This definition is often referred to by various groups, but the imperfections of this definition are seen from the bias in which the public sector is considered as the only area of corruption. Experts such as Rose-Ackerman (1974); Tanzi (1998) [11], Bowles (2000) [12] and Transparency International (2012) [13] state that corruption does not only occur in the private sector.

According to Jain (2001), although it is difficult to define corruption that is acceptable to all parties, but there is a consensus that corruption refers to acts of public officials who use their authority for personal interests, in a manner contrary to the rules and regulations. Furthermore, the occurrence of corruption by state officials is due to 3 things, namely: (1) The official's power to determine public policy and / or administer the policy, (2) The existence of economic rents, is the economic benefits that exist as a result of the public policy and (3) a system that opens opportunities for violations.

Corruption can be classified in 5 ways, including bribery, embezzlement, fraud, extortion, and favoritism (Andvig et. al, 2000) [14]. In Indonesia, according to the law, corruption is grouped in 7 cases (Ardimisma, 2006) [15], namely: (1) State financial losses; (2) Bribery; (3) Embezzlement in office; (4) Extortion; (5) cheating; (6) Conflicts of interest in procurement and services and (7) Gratuities.

Jain (2001) states that corruption relations in a democratic society can be grouped into Grand Corruption, Bureaucrats Corruption, and Legislative Corruption. The three types of corruption are shown in dotted lines in bold. Each has differences in the types of decisions taken due to abuse of power from officials.




Figure 2. Corruption Relations in a Democratic Government (source: Jain (2001:74))

Based on the picture above, Grand Corruption is the relationship (1) between politicians and constituents, generally referring to the actions of political elites, who exploit their authority in making public policy. As elected officials, politicians should make resource allocation decisions based on the principle's interests, which is the public. In making decisions they must balance the interests of various segments in society, as well as their own interests to maintain their power. A corrupt political elite will change national policies or their implementation to serve their own interests at public expense.

Bureaucratic corruption is shown in the picture of the relationship (2) between the appointed bureaucrats who are making agreements with their superiors (politicians), and with the public. In general, this corruption is known as petty corruption. The public must bribe bureaucrats to get the services they are supposed to get, or in order to speed up bureaucratic procedures. Occasionally, bribery is carried out in order to get services that should not be allowed. Bureaucrats sometimes also receive payments for assignments given to them from the political elite. Corruption in court to alleviate fines or penalties is also included in this category of corruption.

Legislative corruption, as seen in the relationship (3), refers to the manner and behavior of legislator voters who can be influenced. Legislators can be bribed by groups that have an interest in influencing legislation that can change revenues that affect wealth. The practice of 'vote buying' in order to be re-elected is also included in this type of corruption.

The results of Weyland's (2004) research [16] in Latin America show that corruption tends to increase sharply when a number of countries switch to a democratic system, because under the democratic system there is a spread of power centers. As a result, there are more veto players who make way for the expansion of bribery centers. Second, political democratization often stimulates neoliberal policies in the economy characterized by capital intervention in the drafting of legislation, as well as the privatization of state enterprises. This phenomenon opens space for bribery practices in order to smooth the interests of capital in winning the competition. Third, voter support in the context of democracy with poor performance of political parties makes the cost of political campaigns expensive. This encourages veto players to inflate party finances by playing "soap" with the capital owners, despite sacrificing the "rule of law".

Krause and Mendez (2007) [17] examine the effects of corruption on voter behavior. The results found an increase in corruption in public office affects the behavior of government officials who were sentenced for not being elected in the next election. Nicolescu and Waggoner (2010) [18] conducted a study of the negative effects of corruption on the implementation of good governance in South America. He found that increasing corruption in South American countries had an impact on the low implementation of good governance.

In Indonesia, Fauzi (2014 [19] found that the quality of direct regional head election elections had a direct and significant effect on the level of regional head corruption, which meant the better the quality of direct regional head elections, the lower the level of regional head corruption. Research at the University of Indonesia Faculty of Administrative Sciences (2018) [20] found that the main factor triggering corruption in regional government was the implementation of direct regional head elections because Regional Heads had to bear political, operational costs, contribute to parties and even demand their constituents to 'contribute' something, otherwise they were reluctant chosen it. As a result, executive and legislative officials in the regions conspired to manipulate the regional budget.

In contrast to previous studies, this study describes the typology of the interaction between bureaucrac, political elite, legislator in the implementation of direct regional head elections, which helps to understand area corruption in regional government during direct elections. This typology was adapted from Jain's (2001) opinion identification in a paper entitled "Corruption: a Review" (Figure 2). This typology has also been used by Wijayanto (2009) [21], but the difference, Wijayanto describes the interaction between state actors to understand corruption in Indonesia, while the authors developed this typology to understand corruption in the area of regional government in the implementation of direct elections. Thus, the purpose of the study is to describe the typology of corruption in the direct election of regional heads and describe the lessons learned from the implementation of direct regional head elections to improve the implementation of direct regional head elections in the future.

II. METHOD

This study uses qualitative methods (Creswell, 2013) [22]. Qualitative methods are considered appropriate to answer the objectives of the study, namely describing the typology of corruption in the implementation of direct regional head elections and learning direct elections and future improvement. Data collection is carried out through:

(1) Focus Group Discussion (FGD) involving experts / academics, government practitioners and stakeholders. The FGD is intended to produce corruption mapping involving actors in the implementation of direct regional head elections; (2) The literature review and legislation analysis. Literature review is conducted to obtain concepts relevant to studies sourced from scientific journals, books, research results and online media sources. Data were analyzed descriptively based on explanations based on expert information submitted in the discussion and literature.

III. DISCUSSION

Corruption typology in Direct regional head Election

The mapping of interaction between actors involving political leaders, bureaucrats and legislators and population described by Jain (2012) is used to help provide an overview of the typology of corruption in the implementation of direct elections as outlined in Figure




Figure 3. Interaction patterns between actors that have the potential to become a area for corruption in direct elections (adapted from Jain, 2001)

[1] = Bureaucracy Area; [2]= Political Elit Area; [3]= Legislator Area; [4]= Civil Society Area

(1) Interaction in corruption-vulnerable areas of bureaucrats, consisting of three parts, (1) Interaction in corruption-vulnerable areas of bureaucrats, consisting of three parts, i.a. (1) interaction between political leaders that is prospective regional heads as incumbent with bureaucratic officials in regional governments, (2) Interaction

between regional heads and KPU and (3) interaction between the Pilkada security team, the KPU and regional government.

Interaction between regional head candidates as incumbent and bureaucratic officials can lead to abuse of authority to utilize the regional budget (APBD) for the benefit of regional heads who are candidates for direct regional head elections. APBD should be used for regional development needs, public services and improving the regional economy. Misuse of APBD because the incumbent has access and authority in controlling bureaucratic officials, budgets and employees.

The mode of corruption by utilizing bureaucracy is by entrusting programs and budgets in most work units (Agencies / Offices / Offices) that handle social problems during the year or two years leading up to the elections. The giving of assistance to the community by the regional head in an effort to attract voters' sympathy in the form of donations and social assistance. As a favor to bureaucratic officials, the regional head will give a promotion if he wins the election. Conversely, if bureaucratic officials are reluctant to fulfill the interests of regional heads who become candidates, then the official is considered to be rendered not worthy of service and will lose his position if the regional head is re-elected [23]. This situation is in line with a study conducted by KPPOD (2015) [24] which found that the abuse of the authority of prospective regional head candidates (incumbent) by carrying out budgetary interventions in the bureaucracy for political purposes caused public services to be hampered and bureaucracy that was not neutral. Such conditions colored the government bureaucracy to the staff and village officials.

The second interaction between prospective regional heads as incumbent with the Election Commission in the management of regional election financing. The authority of the regional head that is strong in the management of the regional budget, that is, as the holder of the budget power, can be utilized for the sake of strengthening their interests in the elections. The position of the KPUD as a budget user is often "held hostage" by the determination of the Pilkada budget because it depends on the approval of the regional head who is often also an incumbent candidate. The dependency of the KPUD on the disbursement of funds which is often late, increasingly makes the bargaining position of the KPUD in the holding of the elections to be weak. A strong position as the holder of the budget power can be utilized by incumbent to conduct transactions with the KPUD.

The mode of misuse of authority is to facilitate the KPU in proposing election budget proposals. In the process of submitting this proposal, the potential to enlarge the proposed budget line by the KPU can be done by taking the highest limit even though regional financial capacity is inadequate. On the other hand, incumbent can establish closeness with the KPU as the organizer of the election for the sake of nominating as candidates for the elections. Conversely, incumbent can also take lobby steps so that the KPU takes sides with its political interests. In this situation, there could be an opportunity to make a hidden agreement so that the KPU embezzled the votes to win the pair of candidates or made it difficult to nominate potential figures that appeared in an area. On the other hand, the role of the Election Supervisory Body has not been optimized in assisting the Election Commission in overseeing the budget politicization carried out by the incumbent.

The third interaction, which is an area of misuse of the regional budget is the Pilkada security budget to finance security forces (TNI and Polri). Security budgeting is mandatory in nature and adjusted to the needs and abilities of

regions and is prioritized in areas with high election vulnerability index (IKP) such as Papua, West Java, East Java and West Kalimantan. On the ground situation are often the Regional Government and the KPU must incur operational security costs that often burden these two institutions. This situation encourages them to take on sources that are not intended for the cost of securing the elections. In fact, the security budget procedures have been distributed to each agency, namely the National Police and the TNI.

(2) Interaction in the area of political elites that are vulnerable to corruption, namely interactions between regional heads and political parties that can lead to areas of corruption, if the regional head becomes a participant in the elections. Prospective participants in the elections must pay high political costs because they have to pay political parties and move the political parties' machines. In order to advance candidates for the Pilkada from the "obligatory" party have the financial strength because of the existence of a "political dowry". Mahar politics can be simply defined as the political costs that must be incurred by a pair of candidates in the elections to obtain "blessing" and party recommendations that are carried and or nominated in the elections (Syamsudin Haris, 2018) [25].

Mahar politics are often termed "boat politics costs". Because political dowry is illegal, there is no standard on how much the candidate pair must deposit. Automatic candidate pairs need financial capital. For example, to get one political party support, the candidate pair must pay 1 billion, then to get 5 political parties support the candidate pair must spend 5 billion to get political party support. Then, if 5 billion is added to winning votes in the DPRD, then the total money needed by the candidate pair is 10 billion at a minimum. This figure is only an estimate, due to the fact that the numbers deposited by candidates to political parties can increase in accordance with the size of the coalition parties.

The candidate pair also requires a significant amount of expenses for the successful and winning teams, campaign costs, witness costs at the polling station (TPS) including the cost of resolving the election cases in the Constitutional Court (MK). This condition caused many regional heads and deputy regional heads to be "held hostage" to restore political capital. In the period 2005-2018 many regional heads were involved in legal issues, especially corruption.

(3) Interaction in the legislative area that is vulnerable to corruption, consists of two parts, namely (1) the interaction of the regional head and the DPRD and (2) the interaction between the political parties and the DPRD.

Interaction between regional head candidates as incumbent and DPRD related to the practice of buying seats. The way for incumbents to get the support of political parties that have a majority seat in the DPRD, incumbents do "buying boats" by paying handsomely to get political vehicles as a means of gaining mass support towards the chair of the regional head. To reach the nomination limit of 15 percent of the vote, allowing candidates to have a coalition with several major parties which would certainly make the candidates pour out a large fee. Then when regional heads have been elected various policies need DPRD approval, this interaction opens up opportunities for legislative corruption in the form of bribes to or extortion by DPRD members.

The practice of buying and selling political vehicles should be degraded by a Constitutional Court ruling that allows regional head candidates from independent candidates to meet the requirements, including Indonesian

citizens, domiciled for at least five years in their area, collecting proof of Identity Card (KTP) with the number of voters in the area concerned. But it is rare for a candidate to win from this independent path, so using political dowry and paying rent for "party vehicles" continues to entrench with fantastic numbers.

The results of the study are in line with research conducted by Rinaldi et.al. (2007) [26] on 10 cases of corruption that occurred in five provinces in Indonesia during the elections of West Sumatra, East Java, West Nusa Tenggara, West Kalimantan, and Central Sulawesi. Based on the pattern or modus operandi of corruption carried out by the DPRD by increasing and enlarging budget lines, channeling APBD funds to institutions / foundations turns fictitious, and manipulation of official travel. The official travel mode is considered the safest way from the threat of corruption, due to the absence of instruments that limit the frequency of regional heads and DPRDs within a week, a month or a year.

Another mode of corruption is to manipulate the remaining regional budget. According to Labolo (2012) and Fitra (2013) [27] that the absence of instruments in the distribution of the remaining APBDs and the situation that confronted the regional head on the momentum of the elections and the pressure of the DPRD encouraged the regional head to take pragmatic actions. The distribution of the remaining APBD is carried out within the legal framework through regional regulations and regional head decisions, so that it can be utilized and not returned to the central government according to the existing regulatory procedures.

One of the factors triggering legislative corruption in Indonesia is the absence of strong opposition groups. Certain interest groups have a great opportunity to be able to smooth their ideas through lobby at a lower cost because they simply "bribe" one group only. On the other hand, the absence of strong opposition also reduces the risk of corrupt acts of members of the legislature and certain interest groups, due to the absence of opposition parties who have the potential to expose the irregularities that occur (Wijayanto, 2009) [28].

The interaction between Political Parties and DPRDs that have an impact on corruption is reviewed by party coalitions in the DPRD. In the majority of provinces, districts and cities, the number of parties that gets the allocation of DPRD seats by 15 percent is very limited. In fact, there are regions where none of the parties that get DPRD seats is as much as 15 percent. Thus, the promotion of candidate pairs must be done through a coalition of at least two or more parties in the regional DPRD. The large number of parties that form a coalition and / or indirectly drive the government. differences in party masses that form a coalition play a role as a factor in the occurrence of high-cost elections, which in turn triggers incidents of corruption. This is in line with Ambardi's research (2008) [29] that legislative institutions can create relationships in coalitions through representatives of political parties in the ranks of government. This is intended to build cartels for the needs of political parties to secure their access to non-budgetary funds.

(4) Corruption Interaction in the Informal Leader area that is prone to corruption, consists of two parts, namely (1) the interaction between regional heads and business leaders and informal leaders and (2) interaction between voters and regional head candidates.

High political costs are charged by candidates not only to pay a political dowry in order to obtain political vehicles from parties that have a mass base. But it is also burdened with 'rental' costs in various forms, including candidates being asked to fund various costs for campaign activities, the costs of hiring political marketing experts, costs for building physical facilities with voice bags, image building costs and image bubbling (self-success candidates) and much more. But to finance it all, many candidates do not have enough funds. Therefore, regional head candidates are often looking for entrepreneurs to join as "political investors" (Muhamad A. Yusuf, 2010) [30]. As an investment return for the participation of entrepreneurs and community leaders who become investors to win the elections. The entrepreneurs and community leaders were promised by the candidates to get many privileges (economic and political protection). Furthermore, Tjahya Supriatna (2013) [31] states that after the elections, using formal authority owned by elected regional heads, entrepreneurs and leaders who successfully gather the masses will turn into formal status owners, they can determine positions in the organizational structure. Regional governments determine formal decision making. So that this informal government is indirectly able to indirectly drive the current government. They have roles in many positions, for example, determining who is promoted into the bureaucratic position of the regional government, determining the winners of tenders which often occur illegally without going through the proper tender process.

According to Syarif Hidayat (2009) [32] if the election process is colored by political and business alliances, it is not surprising that elected regional heads will devote more loyalty to their political and business clients than to their constituents. Theoretically among the most common dangers is the emergence of "informal governance" practices, namely a government whose performance is under the control of strong social, economic and political forces that operate outside formal government structures, William Reno (1995) and Barbara Harris White (1999) in Syarif Hidayat (2009) has referred to each of these informal governance practices as "shadow state" and "informal governance". In line with this Supriatna (2013) also states Shadow state or informal governance in the form of elites who have power but are not legitimate. For example, political parties, business people, and social elites who have power over elected political leadership.

The purpose of implementing the law on decentralization and autonomy is to encourage the implementation of the process of democratization in regional government. However, seeing the elite's interaction in the direct regional head elections turned out to have the opportunity to bring up new channels for practices of abuse of power such as money politics and lobbying that led to bribery or gratification. This is one of the risks of a decentralized and regional autonomy system where full control of regional elites is possible (see, for example, Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2002 [33], Martinez-Vasquez and Nab, 1997 [34], and Sewell, David O. 1995 [35]).

Lessons Learned from the Weaknesses of Direct regional head Election and Future Improvements

Interaction among elites that opens up corruption space in the implementation of regional head elections, due to several reasons, among others:

Weak political parties. Supposedly, political parties play a role in creating cadres and superior leadership generations. But the fact is, there is a party's sentiment and ego that is more concerned with cadres with financial ability, rather than qualified ability and credibility. One contributing factor is the weak role of political parties that have not yet carried out the function of cadre recruitment, political education and interest aggregation. According to Spirova (2008) [36] in the long run this weakens the power of the party in a ruling regime because corruption practices contribute to reducing the popularity of the regime making it easy to be influenced by outside parties.

Less optimal Organizing Institutions. KPU as the organizer is not optimal in applying the rules and creating a conducive atmosphere to close the space for corruption and money politics among incumbent actors, DPRD, businessmen, leaders and voters. Therefore, effective supervision is needed by the Election Oversight Body (Bawaslu) if violations occur. But in fact, there is a non-transparency in the budget of each candidate participating in the elections, which also indicates the weak function of Bawaslu's control over money politics.

Lack of political education. The function of political socialization and political communication has not become an important part of the activities of political parties to educate voters to be rational in the elections. In fact, the function of facilitation and political education is important so that people rationally choose candidates who have good competence and morality. The community needs to be educated to act as a political object, and be actively involved in the political process.

Weak supervision. regional head elections often cause problems in aspects of budgetary use because of abuse of authority by regional officials. Besides that, there was also an inefficiency in the use of the budget of the Election Commission, which most of the expenditure was used to pay the organizers' fees (KPPS-PPS). Then, the differences in honorarium standards between regions also lead to large expenditure (wasteful). For example, there is a monthly honorarium and work group fees, or administrative and routine expenditure. Forming many working groups has implications for the amount of the honorarium.

Inefficient election security costs. The operational costs of securing regional head elections often encounter obstacles because they must be held by the regional government and the KPU, which are very burdensome, even though they have been channeled through the police and military agencies for their troops in the field.

Future Improvements

Eradication of corruption involving elites in direct elections, requires an integrated approach between regulation, structure, culture (Schuler and Thomas, 1997) [37]. Revamping the regulatory aspects, by revising the laws and regulations that create loopholes so that the opportunity for corruption in the implementation of direct elections. According to Pradipto (2013) [38] the current legal regulations are not strict in regulating political party finances. Therefore, political party financial oversight and determination of penalties for all forms of violations committed by political parties. Second, increasing the 'legal subsidy' through non-financial mechanisms, for example by providing slot time slots and columns for political advertising in the mass media.

Settling on the structural or institutional aspects is intended to limit politicians, political elites and economic elites to violate the rights of other members of society to create unbalanced competition, and guarantee each member of the community to have equal opportunities to participate in productive activities (Pradypto, 2015) [39]. One of the strategies, according to Chene (2011) [40], is to fill in the Report of State Officials' Assets (LHKPN) or asset declaration. This opinion is in line with the study of Mukherjee and Gokcekus (2006) [41] related to LHKPN in 16 countries showing that a country that has a verified and open (publicly accessible) public official wealth reporting system is significantly associated with the perception of a low level of corruption.




Figure 4 Triangulation of Regulation-Structure-Culture Framework, adapted from Schuler and Thomas (1997)

The improvement in the aspect of culture is to change the culture of perception of corruption in society. Some experts, including Pramusinto (2016) [42] suggested the importance of education among the younger generation to introduce new values and dilute old values. This is based on the idea that the phenomenon of corruption has been entrenched in society (Kholik, 2002, in Pramusinto, 2016). Even the community considers corrupt behavior is a small thing (petty corruption). In accordance with the results of the Governance Survey research (Dwiyanto, 2007 in the 2016 Pramusinto) it was found that the community considered the behavior of bribery to be common among them. The need for anti-corruption political education can be in the form of awareness programs whose objectives are (Elwina, 2011) [44]: (1) Disseminating information and raising awareness about corruption; (2) Changes in perceptions and behavior towards corruption and (3) Provision of new skills and abilities needed to eradicate corruption.

IV. CONCLUSION

The typology of corruption involving actors during Pilkada can be identified as follows: (1) the interaction between political leaders and regional bureaucrats in the Regional Government and the Election Commission. Corruption occurs because the position of regional head as the holder of the budget and access to control the budget

and bureaucrats. (2) interaction between regional head candidates as incumbents and political party elites. This interaction creates an area of corruption when candidates have to pay political parties to get political vehicles to become participants in the elections. (3) Interaction between regional head candidates and the legislature becomes an area prone to corruption when regional head candidates as incumbents buy seats from the majority party in the DPRD. The mode of corruption of regional heads by manipulating the remaining regional budget on the basis of establishing regional regulations together with the legislature (DPRD) and increasing the number and frequency of official travel of DPRD members. where entrepreneurs and community leaders have unregitified powers in terms of determining positions in the bureaucracy and Government projects. (4) Interaction between regional government head candidates and informal leaders is prone to corruption, when in the post-regional elections there was a shadow state in which entrepreneurs and community leaders had un-legitimate regional powers in determining positions in the bureaucracy and Government projects.

Lessons learned from the corruption that occur in the interaction between actors during the elections, including the weaknesses of political parties in the recruitment and regeneration of leaders, election organizing institutions (KPUD, Bawaslu, Panwaslu) that have not been functioning and have optimal roles in the elections, as well as a lack of political education causing voters to be irrational.

REFERENCES

- [1] Pradiptyo R, Wirotomo A, Hilman RM, Azzan M, .2015. Academic Paper of the Anti-Corruption Bulaksumur Initiative. Gadjah Mada University.
- [2] Mauro, P.1995. "Corruption and Growth". Quarterly Journal of Economics, 110(3): 681-712.
- [3] Mauro, P.1998. "Corruption and the composition of government expenditure". Journal of Public Economics 69 (1998) 263–279
- [4] Cuervo, A and Cazorro. 2006. "Who cares about corruption". Journal of International Business Studies 37, 807–822
- [5] Cambridge Advanced Learner's Dictionary.2003. Cambridge University Press.
- [6] Rose-Ackerman, S., 1974. 'The Economics of Corruption'. Journal of Public Economics, 4: 187- 203.
- [7] World Bank.1997. The role of a national integrity system in Fighting Corruption. Peter Langset at al, the economic development institute of the world bank.
- [8] Klitgaard, R., 1998. 'International Cooperation Against Corruption'. Journal of Finance and Development, 35(1): 3-6.
- [9] Jain, Arvin.K. 2001. "Corruption: A Review". Journal of Economic Perspektive, Colorado University, Vol 15 No 1. Blackwell Publisher.
- [10] Chang, E. C. C., 2013. "A Comparative Analysis of How Corruption Erodes Institutional Trust". Taiwan Journal of Democracy, 9(1): 73-92.
- [11] Tanzi, V., 1998. 'Corruption Around the World: Causes, Consequences, Scope, and Cures'. Staff Papers – International Monetary Fund, 45(4): 559-594.
- [12] Bowles, R. 2000. "Corruption,". in B. Boudewijn and G. De Greest, eds. Encyclopedia of Law and Economics, Vol. 5, The Economics of Crime and Litigation 460- 491, Edward Elgar.
- [13] Transparency International. 2013. Corruption Perception Index 2013. Berlin: Transparency International.
- [14] Andvig, Jens, Chr, Fjeldstad O. H, Amundesen. I, Sissener, T, Soreide.T (2000). Research on Corruption A Policy Oriented Survey, Commissioned by NORAD, Chr Michelsen Institute & Norwegian Institute of Intenational Affair (NUPI), www.icgg.org/download/contribution_advig.pdf

- [15] Ardimisma, S.2006. The Definition of Corruption According to Legal Perspectives and E-Announcement for Open, Transparent and Accountable Governance. Presented at the National Seminar on Efforts to Improve the Procurement System of Government Goods and Services, Jakarta, Agustus 23rd, 2006.
- [16] Weyland, K. 1998. "The politic of Corruption in Latin America". *Journal of Democracy*, 9 (2) pp 108
- [17] Krause, S and Mendez, F. 2009. "Corruption and Elections: An Empirical Study for a Cross-Section of Countries". *Journal Economics and Politics* 21 pp179-200. University of Arkansas - Sam M. Walton College of Business
- [18] Waggoner, R. 2010. *Corruption and Injustice: A Broken System*. Create Space Independent Publishing Platform.
- [19] Fauzi, G. 2014. *Democracy and Corruption: Study of Direct regional head Elections and Corruption of Regional Heads*. CV. Idra Prahasta. Jakarta
- [20] Faculty of Administrative Sciences University of Indonesia. 2018. *Patterns of Corruption in the Region*. FIA-UI
- [21] Wijayanto.2009. *Understanding Corruption, In Corruption Corrupting Indonesia: Causes, Effects and Prospects of Eradication*. Gramedia Pustaka Utama. Jakarta.
- [22] Creswell John W. 1994. *Research Design: Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches*: California: SAGE Publications, Inc,
- [23] Labolo, M. 2012." Corruption Gap in Regional Government". *Journal of Government Science*. Eds 39 pp 68-87 Jakarta.
- [24] KPPOD. 2015. Simultaneous regional elections, regional democracy, and effectiveness of regional government, Policy Brief Eds 1
- [25] Haris, Syamsuddin.2018. Is the Regulation of "Political Politics" Necessary? Paper presented at the FGD at the Research and Development Agency – Ministry of Home Affairs, February 12, 2018.
- [26] Rinaldi T, Purnomo M Damayanti D (2007), *Fighting Corruption in Decentralized Indonesia, Case Studies on Handling Regional Government Corruption*, siteresources.worldbank.org
- [27] Fitra (Indonesian forum for Budget Transparency). 2013. Efficient and Democratic Regional Election Financing. Presented at the Discussion on Cost Efficiency in the Regional Election. Research and Development Agency - Ministry of Home Affairs, July 1st, 2013.
- [28] Widjayanto.2009. *Patterns of Corruption: Corruption Corrupts in Indonesia*. Gramedia Publishing Jakarta.
- [29] Ambardi, K. 2008. *Political Cartel and Political Corruption in Indonesia*. Dissertation of Semarang State University UNNES. Semarang.
- [30] Yusuf Mohamad.2010. Elections and regional expansion in regional democracy in Indonesia: Regional strongmen dan roving bandits. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/311419344_Pilkada_dan_pemekaran_daerah_dalam_demokrasi_regional_di_Indonesia_Regional_strongmen_dan_roving_bandits
- [31] Supriatna, Tjahya. 2013. The Effect of Regional Election Conflicts and Disputes on Regional Government. Paper presented at the FGD at the Research and Development Agency, Ministry of Home Affairs, Agustus 22, 2013.
- [32] Hidayat, Syarif. 2009. *Pilkada, Money Politic and The Dangers of "Informal Governance" Practicy. DeepeningDemocracyin Indonesia: Direct Ellections for Regional Leaders*. Institute South east Asian Studies.
- [33]. Bardhan, P. (1997). Corruption and development: A Review of Issues. *Journal of Economic Literature*, 35, pp 1320-1346 Besley.
- [34] Vazquez, JM and Mc Nab, R.2000. *Tax Reform in TheTax Reform Experiment in Transitional Countries*. International Study Program. Working Paper.
- [35] Sewell, David O. 1995. "The dangers of decentralization according to Prud'homme: some further aspects". *The World Bank Research Observer*, 11 (1) pp 143-150
- [36] Sadikin, Hasan Usep.2016. "Simultaneous Elections, Concentrating Regional Election Budgets". *Jurnal Perludem*, Edisi 8. pp 21-47.
- [37] Spirova, Maria. (2008). "Corruption and Democracy: The 'Color Revolutions' in Georgia and Ukraine". *Taiwan Journal of Democracy*, 4 (2). pp 75-90.

- [38] Schuler and Thomas (1997), Women's Human Rights: Step by step, WLDI, Washington DC
- [39] Pradipto Rimawan (2013), Map of Corruption in Indonesia, in the Seminar: Building Accountability of Political Parties: Conquering Corruption (Challenges to Eradicate Corruption in 2014, acch.kpk.go.id/documents/10157/27926/peta-korupsi-indonesia.pdf)
- [40] Pradipto, R (2015), A Certain Uncertainty; Assessment of Court Decisions in Tackling Corruption in Indonesia, in Ghosh.
- [41] Chene, M. 2011. "Foreign exchange controls and assets declarations for politicians and public officials." Transparency International.
- [41] Mukherjee, Ranjana and Omer Gokcekus. (2006). "Officials' Asset Declaration Laws: Do They Prevent Corruption?" Transparency International's Global Corruption Report.
- [42] Pramusinto, A.2016. Encouraging Change from Outside: Towards A Democratic and Servicing Indonesian Bureaucracy. Speech of Inauguration Position of Professor of State Administration at FISIP UGM.
- [43] Elwina, Marcela. 2011. Efforts to Eradicate Corruption, in Anti-Corruption Political Education. Director General of Higher Education Ministry of Education and Culture. Jakarta.
- [44] Jones, D., Min, W. An overview of lymphatic vessels and their emerging role in cardiovascular disease (2011) *Journal of Cardiovascular Disease Research*, 2 (3), pp. 141-152.
- [45] PV Kamala Kumari, S Akhila, Y Srinivasa Rao and B. Rama Devi. "Alternative to Artificial Preservatives." *Systematic Reviews in Pharmacy* 10.1 (2019), 99-102. Print. doi:10.5530/srp.2019.1.17
- [46] Ram Jha, H., Nand Singh, S. Study of scattering parameters and gain of two longitudinal slots of same electrical lengths milled on two waveguides for series and shunt slot array planar antenna (2015) *Bonfring International Journal of Research in Communication Engineering*, 5 (3), pp. 12-21.
- [47] Schenck, C.H. Update on sexsomnia, sleep related sexual seizures and forensic implications (2015) *NeuroQuantology*, 13 (4), pp. 518-541.
- [48] D. Senthil, G. Suseendran "Data Mining Techniques Using Time Series Research" , *International Journal of Recent Technology and Engineering*, Vol.8,(2S11), September 2019, pp. 121-129 , DOI: 10.35940/ijrte.B1020.0982S1119
- [49] Noor Zaman, and Mnueer Ahmed, "Towards the Evaluation of Authentication Protocols for Mobile Command and Control Unit in Healthcare," *Journal of Medical Imaging and Health Informatics*, Vol 7, no 3, pp 739-742, 2017