# Political Will Government in Prevention of Post-Reform Corruption IN Indonesia

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*Abstract-This article focuses on discussing the political will of the government in preventing post-reform corruption in Indonesia. This study aims to see how the political will of the government in combating corruption. Methods applied by using a qualitative approach with descriptive purposes. Data collection was done purposively and documentation studies from various secondary sources. This research found that the government has political will reflected in policies to eradicate corruption in Indonesia. Government policies related to the political interests of political parties. The existence of party political interests can eventually be an obstacle to handling corruption. In addition to a plan, the government's political will in eradicating corruption also reflected in the formation of institutions/bodies that deal with crime. The existence of these institutions/bodies correlates with the political will of the government. The actors working in these institutions/agencies are representative of the government. This research concludes that in dealing with corruption, the government has political will through the issuance of policies that favor the rule of law and the institutions/agencies tasked with eradicating corruption.*

*Keywords-corruption, political will, government, reform era.*

## I.   INTRODUCTION

One important phenomenon that must receive the attention of the Indonesian government at this time is the prevention and handling of corruption. The government's political will in handling crime is the focus of this study. Some studies see it has done by many experts. The Kaligis study saw that corruption in this country had been going on for a long time, tribute, money offered to the authorities had always happened (Kaligis, 2006). While Astuti's study saw that corruption still pervaded and afflicted various levels of society, even it had roots and culture

Other reviews see corruption as inherent in power, where commitment to leadership integrity is the basis of anti-corruption policies (Recanatini, 2011). Some studies understand that people need to be involved in fighting corruption (Heeks and Mathisan, 2012; Johnston, 2014). A more tendentious view suggests that the fight against abuse of power by public officials is a matter of incentive Maravall and Przeworski, 2003). At the same time, there is an increasing awareness that political will to fight corruption is weak because active perpetrators of the crime will benefit and perpetrate fraud (Della Porta and Vannuci 2012; Johnston, 2014; Fritzen, 2005).

Corruption handling studies also see that the model or pattern that occurs can be approached by the political economy press specifically, using principal-agent-client analysis (Klitgaard, 1988). Likewise, politics as part of the process of gaining power, then politics is associated with specific goals (Wall, 2007). In the same perspective,

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politics also deals with the level of responsibility in democracy (Potter and Travits, 2011). Even in other studies, proportional political systems have a higher chance of corruption (Kunicova and Ackerman (2005).

The study of political will in dealing with and eradicating corruption is quite a lot done by experts, especially political will in handling corruption in developing countries (Pope and Vogi, 2000; Brinkerhoff, 2000; and Pkundeh, 1998). Some of these studies provide a description of a government / state's experience in dealing with corruption. In the Asia Pacific region, there are countries that have succeeded in dealing with corruption, including Singapore and Hong Kong. Most of the successful handling of corruption is caused by good political communication by political leaders in dealing with corruption (Quah, 2003; Ho, 2003). Even lately there are studies analyzing in Uganda that despite significant progress in building institutional and legal frameworks in dealing with corruption, corruption reform in the country has not yet yielded satisfactory results mainly due to the lack of a clear presentation of political will in implementing reforms (Amundsen, 2006 ). While the explanation of corruption in certain countries is useful for the explanation and depiction of practical lessons in policy (Montinola, 1997).

The study of political will in reducing or eradicating corruption is an important part of the agenda of political leaders because political office is seen as a means to provide support or benefits for a small group or family of perpetrators (Pope, 2000). Because political office has the opportunity to abuse authority, political will in efforts to eradicate corruption often fails in developing countries (theobald, 1990). Transparency International considers that most developing countries fail to eradicate corruption (Transparency International, 2005).

Corruption actors from among political actors are mostly done when conducting campaigns (Frintz and Menocal, 2006). Indonesia, as a part of developing countries, is ranked the fifth most corrupt country (out of a total surveyed by 146 countries (Suwitri, 2017; Quah, 2012). In addition, a survey of global corruption watchdog institutions, Transparency International (TI) in 2018 released data that Indonesia's corruption perception index rose by one point to 38 from a scale of 0-100. However, Indonesia's position is still ranked 89 out of 180 countries, this figure increased in 2019 where the figure rose two points to 40 (Jayani, 2020).

Although the struggle to eradicate corruption has been increasing lately, this stretching is not fully supported by the government. For example, the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) as an anti-trust institution that is trusted by the public has actually been weakened by the government through the Corruption Eradication Commission Act Number 19 of 2019 concerning the KPK. YLBHI said the KPK was weakened through the election of KPK leaders who were not independent and the cessation of the investigation function at the Supervisory Board (Bayu, 2019). In fact, Transparency International's (TI) record of Indonesia's corruption perception index in 2019 is the independence and effectiveness of the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) weakened by the Indonesian government (Jayani, 2020).

The eradication of corruption that has taken over as it is now needs the support of various parties, especially the government as the state organizer (Sidauruk, 2011). In addition to the strong commitment of state employees, the right target rules, also need more will from the government (political will). Singapore is the best ASEAN country in matters of handling corruption. Eric Tan, Director of the Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau (CPIB) of

Singapore, stated that the effective handling of corruption was carried out through a number of strategies, one of which was the political will of the government.

There are indications that the government and legislature to weaken the KPK contradict public concerns about eradicating corruption, especially through KPK institutions. Thus, the eradication of ongoing corruption requires consistent efforts and sincere commitment from the political elite. If the commitment of the political elite in eradicating corruption is weak, it will tend to dwell on the discussion of zero tolerance for corruption, but continues to play a tolerance of corruption (Abdulai, 2010).

The purpose of this study is to look at how the government's political will in handling corruption in post-reform Indonesia. This political will is mainly seen from the aspect of legitimate political leaders.

## II.    LITERATURE REVIEW

Corruption is one of Indonesia's biggest problems today. Corruption (Latin: Corruptio or Corruptus) according to the World Bank is an abuse of the authority of state administrators to gain personal and group benefits (Indriati, 2014; Daniel, 2011). Corruption is a disease of democracy and modernity. This statement implies that before the democratic system existed, corruption was not widespread. The definition of corruption according to the World Bank, corruption is an abuse of the authority of state administrators to achieve personal and group benefits. Corruption to get this profit is done in several ways, such as taking bribes, gratuities, or kick-backs from corporate contact tenders.

Corruption literature that links the strong political will of state or government administrators will fail (Brinkerhoff, 2000; Kpundeh, 1998; Williams and Doig, 2004, Pope and Vogl, 2000). Politicalwill is defined as a credible intention displayed by political actors (Kpundeh, 1998). What is meant by political actors are elected leaders or appointed stakeholder groups, appointed supervisors, or anyone who becomes a leader) (Kpundeh, 1998). Political office is considered as a means, not a public service; public office is also a means to provide a benefit for certain families and groups rather than a whole as a whole (Pope, 2000). Political will in eradicating the phenomenon of corruption should not only concern the problem of political elites who uphold good moral standards, but also they must have a reason that the act of upholding morality is in the interest of fighting corruption.

Theobald (1990) observations that developing countries have failed to control corruption because reform initiatives are based largely or depend on the goodness of political leaders. Teheobald also saw that one of the most effective instruments in maintaining political will was democracy. Here, democracy can guarantee transparency and institutionalized accountability mechanisms, political rights are well protected, and people have clear decision-making power outside the electoral arena. The survey from Transparency International has found a striking relationship between large democracy and limited democracy. Of the 20 most corrupt countries, 18 of them are developed democracies, except Singapore and Hong Kong (Transparency International, 2005). Election campaigns are expensive and politicians who raise funds or win votes in various prohibited ways (corruption) (Whitehead, 2002, quoted in Frintz and Menocal, 2006).

Corruption can be categorized as a case that is incidental and systemic. As for the scale, karruption can also be in the form of grand corruption, petty coruption and political corruption. Grand Corruption is the most widespread and negative form of corruption. This form of corruption can usually be traced to high-level government activities that endorse the policies and central functions of the state and enable its leaders to benefit at the expense of the wider community.

Petty corruption refers to the abuse of power by public officials at lower and middle levels in their daily interactions with people who sometimes try to access public services such as hospitals, police, schools or other institutions. Political Corruption is a form of abuse of power by manipulating policies, institutions and rules or procedures, related to the allocation of resources and financing in order to continue to maintain power, status, and wealth.

Corruption patterns can be described by the Principal-Agent analysis unit in political economy (Rose-Ackerman, 1978), and Principal-Agent-Client (Klitgaard, 1988). In the case of corruption in revenue-producing state institutions, such as state companies and tax offices, the Principal is the politician who regulates corruption; while Agent is played by a bureaucrat who runs corruption. Corruption can multiply if the bureaucrat is also looking for a big advantage for himself other than corruption according to the amount desired by the Principal who gave him a position or position in the institution.

Weak political party systems are associated with corruption. The pattern of party funding, how regulations are made by the legislature and the court affect how the relationship between corruption and political party funding is built, the pattern of which varies by country. What if members of political parties serving in state institutions commit corruption, the difference between their wealth before and after taking office cannot be easily explained by their origin.

De Wall (2007) observes that politics happens to humans as well as chimpanzees. De Wall (2007) cites Harold Laswell, who defines politics as a social process with regard to "who gets what, when and how". Chimpanzee political behavior, such as isolation tactics, coalitions and bluffs, is also commonly practiced by humans in the political arena of power.

The number and strength of political parties, the conveyance of party ideology, and internal cohesion are related to the degree of clarity of responsibility in democracy (Potter and Tavits, 2011). Meanwhile, Kunicova and Rose-Ackerman (2005) conclude that the proportional representation system is more vulnerable to corruption than the plurality system.

## III. METHOD

This study is based on using a qualitative approach by utilizing data gathering through interviews with experts and reviewing documentation. In this study, restrictions were placed on the focus on eradicating corruption at the post-reform period. This study uses descriptive methods in the form of narrative texts, views and ideas collected by

researchers from various sources. This study illustrates the phenomenon of the government's political will in eradicating post-reform corruption in Indonesia.

## IV. RESULT AND DISCUSSION

One of the phenomena of post-reform corruption in Indonesia is the low economy of the people and the low political will of the government. The government sees poor people as objects that can be subject to various controls and interventions. The government can intervene substantially with certain policies and actions as a form of the development process. The community can be categorized as poor on government authority because to be called poor it has determined criteria.

After the reformation, the pattern of corruption cannot be done alone. To overcome the culture of corruption must change the mindset of not only state officials, but also corporations and intermediaries from the elements of the people. In the socio-political context related to crimes such as "Position Corruption". The case of buying and selling positions has become a pathological form of corruption in a political context. Example: giving something (for example food, envelopes, etc.) as a form of gratitude to someone who is deemed to have meritorious for helping. To form a pattern, events occur repeatedly and continuously for a long time. Leakage of state money due to corruption through the process of procurement of goods and services can be very large. This type of corruption model can be done in several ways, including: First, changing or replacing technical specifications with cheaper or lower quality. Second, price markups from fair prices in the market. Third, fictitious programs (none but reported to exist). Fourth, program duplication between ministries, and fifth, changing the contract value by reducing activities.

The form of corruption in political terms analyzes party elites involved in corruption, either by buying votes, influencing the market by using political power, kinship politics or dynastic politics, or through contributions to political parties related to construction projects from the state budget and resource concessions. natural. If there is corruption among politicians, the effect is like a snowball, spreading through the process of mimicking. Political corruption and elections can be said that political corruption is closely related to officials from political parties serving in state institutions. Because usually funding sources in political parties that are built from the confidentiality of funding sources tend to be corrupt.

The number of political parties that are too many tends to heighten corruption. This relates to the existence of renters who seek relationships with political parties. The number of political parties is also related to the difficulty of maintaining internal cohesion, because party members can move parties with more choices. Clarity in the responsibilities of members of political parties in democracy is also difficult to maintain when there are a large number of parties.

When there is a monopoly on power and "discretion pretends the interests of the nation and state", there is a tendency for corruption. Individual (or small group) interests on behalf of the interests of the state and nation. Corruption occurs when there is no intention to be transparent by not giving written instructions (only in the form of verbal directions) and accountability is transferred communally to the institution.

Thus, the pattern of political corruption that occurs usually begins with the monopoly of power and "discretion arguing the interests of the nation and state". But corruption occurs when there is no intention to be transparent by not giving written instructions (only in the form of oral directives) and accountability is transferred communally to the institution. And corruption is carried out secretly (clandestine), colluding with more than one person with a shut up movement.

The sale of public office is not based on good leadership skills, but rather based on consideration of commercial profits obtained as public officials, so that the "return of capital" is the goal of new public officials who achieve their position through the buying and selling mechanism. As a result, public positions that are sold by the king's relatives or presidents have the risk of bringing up criminal acts of corruption when they are not formally regulated and not all proceeds go to the treasurer of the king or president and the state. During Abdurrahman Wahid's reign, MPR TAP regulation number 11 of the 1998 MPR on clean and KKN-free state management emerged. Abdurrahman Wahid's government also formed state agencies that were oriented to support the eradication of corruption at the point of the state agencies including: the Joint Team for Corruption Crime Management, the Commission for Checking the Wealth of State Officials, the National Ombudsman Commission and others.

During Megawati Soekarnoputri's leadership, corruption cases evaporated and did not finish on the court table. BUMN that is suspected of having a lot of corruption including corruption in Bulog is incomplete. Megawati formed the Corruption Eradication Commission. The establishment of this institution is considered a legal breakthrough in supporting efforts to eradicate corruption in Indonesia. This institution subsequently became the forerunner to the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK).

In the era of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, the eradication of corruption can be seen from the issuance of Presidential Instruction No. 5 of 2004 and the subsequent preparation of the National Action Plan (RAN) to eradicate corruption. The NAP on corruption eradication was implemented from 2004-2009. In the era of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, the Corruption Eradication Commission was formed through Law number 30 of 2002 concerning the Corruption Court (TIPIKOR) which is separate from the general court. International appreciation is considered sufficient to support the handling of eradication of corruption in the court.

President SBY in his speech at the commemoration of World Anti-Corruption Day in 2011 stated that there were at least five reasons for the importance of fighting corruption, namely: first, corruption had resulted in the loss of roots and state revenues, even though these revenues could be used to build a strong country both in political and military economy. -2 corrupt practices have resulted in reduced economic potential income from Indonesia's natural resources. Thirdly corruption results in losses in state revenues from economic and business activities. A 4, corrupt practices cause mutual distrust and suspicion. Finally, corruption makes the image of Indonesia look bad in the eyes of the international world. This will cause Indonesia to lose its international legitimacy and trust.

In the era of President Joko Widodo, the government's political will in eradicating corruption remained imposed on the KPK as an institution authorized to resolve corruption cases. The President also issued presidential regulation (Perpres) No. 91 of 2019 concerning Organs Implementing the Corruption Eradication Commission

Supervisory Board. This Perpres contains a matter of provisions for the supervisory boards to form an implementing organ called the KPK Supervisory Board Secretariat. President Joko Widodo is more to continue the pattern of corruption eradication as developed by Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono.

Basically, the eradication of corruption in the reform era is still related to KKN. Politics of kinship or dynasty was experienced again by Indonesia in this reform era. Local government officials such as governors and regents in various regions of the Republic of Indonesia are related. Some have even become direct successions. Husband, wife, child, father, brother, and brother-in-law, were proposed to replace the ruling regional head. Although there are no legal rules to regulate local government elections that prohibit kinship, in fact there is an ethics of propriety in government or power which states that such practices are inappropriate. However, the ethics of propriety are nullified by reason of individual constitutional rights. If this is ignored, Indonesia will continue to experience a setback in the government system.

When poverty plagues the people, who cannot even afford to buy rice and eat cassava, while officials live wealthy, there is clearly something wrong with the bureaucratic system and law enforcement. The role of the state, among others, is to reduce the budget deficit and keep the market growing socially equitable, while at the same time providing equal and competitive opportunities for all, thereby reducing economic inequality in the wider community.

Unfortunately, a culture of non-corruption has not yet become a value that is practiced into deeds. Therefore, state officials must be able to maintain distance in relations with prospective third parties to be objective. The principle of maintaining arm-length relationships becomes the ideal bureaucratic basis that is impartial for the sake of economic justice. Spread your arms (arm-length) to keep a distance from others.

Corruption variables from the economic side include bribery, kick back, payoff, and extortion (extortion, extortion), which are based on profit and loss calculations and money-changing transactions in the network of corruptors and profit-sharing systems. Thus, corruption is an economic transaction that is loaded with distributive injustice because only certain parties are involved, who disproportionately and unethically obtain financial benefits that are supposed to benefit the people.

In the reform era, abuse of public power or position for personal interests includes the behavior of officials in the public and private sectors who improperly and illegally enrich themselves or enrich those close to them or encourage them to do so, by abusing the position they are given. Corruption practices are displayed in the form of abuse of public power of work and authority for personal gain through bribery, extortion, nepotism intervention, fraud and embezzlement of money.

Corruption regulations are outlined in Law No. 31 of 1999 and Law No. 20 of 2001 which includes the following actions against the law to enrich itself by other bodies which are detrimental to the financial economy of the country. This regulation states that abusing authority because of a position of office that can harm the financial position that can harm the financial economy of the country, including the matter of gratification.

The government considers that corruption to be a complex problem of corruption that can affect a country and the legitimacy of that country's government. Corruption in this study is classified into two categories, namely macro and micro. An amount of money makes it easier for business people who give money to officers believing that without the money the business they run will face problems in the administrative procedures of the point as well as the general public who want to take care of identity documents related to identity cards and other important documents will experience difficulties or delays if they do not provide facilitation payments.

An auditor at the Supreme Audit Agency gives four reasons why public officials commit physical acts of corruption. The first reason is the pressure factor. This happens because there is a request from relatives or superiors that cannot be avoided. The second reason is the need for someone wanting to own certain objects. luxury but they don't have enough funds to buy it. The third reason for the opportunity factor is how this is done by a public official through his position to enrich himself even though it violates the law. The final reason is the rationality factor. This reason is used by public officials who consider luxury and wealth a natural thing for them.

Society considers that corruption is a form of torment against someone and hurts the sense of justice of the community. The practice of handling cases that are named as suspects is engineered and regulated in such a way that they are only charged to the lower echelon levels, on the grounds that criminal elements / elements found are only for the elements implementing in the field. Meanwhile, superiors do not have enough evidence. This caused superiors who ordered criminal acts not to receive further action.

In Indonesia, crime in the form of corruption has reached the highest levels of officials and officials of the community. However, there are uniqueness in the cases of perpetrators of corruption which are generally carried by officials. People who have done crime do not look like they have guilt, they can even escape from prison, then after being imprisoned, they can be active as politicians and take on various social media. This is no different from the sexual crimes committed by many artists, where after they have committed acts or behaviors that deviate in terms of social values and norms and state law does not look remorse, it even comes back with a new and increasingly famous face.

## V.  CONCLUSION

The political will of the government after the reformation can see from the policymaking in eradicating corruption and establishing its implementing agency. Political will in the Gus Dur era focused more on the formation of state bodies in the form of commissions (in particular the KPKPN, the Ombudsman Commission, and the Joint Team for Corruption Crime Prevention. In the era of Gus Dur,  corruption tended to prioritize aspects of the structuralism system. In addition to encouragement and support activities in civil society at some time of President Megawati Soekarno Puteri, political will was somewhat invisible because of the polarization of political interests still, in this era, it gave a signal for the growth of the KPK. Successfully dragged several corruptors from political actors, such as governors, regional heads, and members of parliament, as well as business people involved in gratification. In this SBY era, a corruption court has been established, which is considered useful in eradicating corruption in Indonesia. Widodo more on the continuation of the pattern of corruption eradication that has done on

SBY. But the Joko Widodo era contributed to guarding the eradication of corruption by regional heads and other political actors.

Corruption eradication is carried out in the context of law enforcement and reducing economic inequality. However, economic inequality also triggers corruption because there is a tendency for the rich to bribe, while the poor want to get rich quickly. Corruption occurs when the campaign and abuse of power when the political actor has elected as a leader. Corruption can be divided into small scale corruption and large scale corruption. But in the process of law enforcement, the government from one period to another has different desires in the eradication of corruption.

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