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Algorithm Game Theory and Mechanism Design

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Abstract--- *Algorithm game and mechanism design is a fields of game theory that aim to develop games. Online mechanism extend the methods of mechanism design to dynamic environment with multiple agents. Decisions must be made as information about types is revealed online and without knowledge of the future in the sense of online algorithms. This paper consider algorithm design, enhancement, and improvement of evolutionary computation as a mechanism design problem. This primary principle can be implemented in any evolutionary computation algorithm that need to consider strategy selection issues in its optimization process. The final objective of our work is to solve evolutionary computation design as an algorithmic mechanism design problem and establish its fundamental aspect by taking this perspective. This paper apply the standard tools of mechanism design to algorithm problems and in particular to the shortest path problem.*

Index Terms--- *Game Theory, Algorithm, Optimization Process, Design.*

I INTRODUCTION

Game theory is the methodology used to research strategic interaction among several self-interested agents. Some important concepts, such as type, strategy, and utility, are useful to an understanding of the theoretical framework of game theory[1]. Agent type indicates the preferences of the agent over different outcomes in a game. A strategy is a plan or a rule, which defines the actions that an agent will select in a game. The utility of an agent determines different allocations and payments under its and other agents[2]' types and strategy profiles; for example, an agent rationality in game theory is to implement the expected utility to be maximum. An agent will select a strategy that maximizes its expected utility, given its preferences with regard to outcomes, beliefs about the strategies of other agents, and structure of the game[3].

Perhaps the foremost natural sub-field of economics to be combined with machine concerns is that of Mechanism design[1]. The field of Mechanism design aims to design economic institutions to come through various economic goals, most notably revenue and financial aid. Combining the points of view of social selection and game theory,[4] it aims to design games whose outcomes are going to be as the game designer needs – whenever rational players have interaction in them. Before this paper tend to divide into the special challenges of the combination of "Algorithmic" with "Mechanism Design," allow us to in the brief present the essential purpose of view of each of those two disciplines separately[5]. The sphere of Mechanism style considers a group of rational players, wherever "rational" is outlined to be as was common in theory – utility-maximizing. A social outcome that the effects of these players must be chosen by a planner World Health Organization (WHO) doesn't have full info, info required for deciding the "preferred" social outcome? The planner's goal is to style a mechanism – a protocol – that once vie by the rational agents leads to AN

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equilibrium that satisfies the planner's goals[6].

The usual treatment of the distributed processors in computer science was that they were either "obedient" programmed and controlled by the designer-engineer or that they were "faulty" during which case we've got no control over their behavior inside the bounds of our fault models. However,[7] for several net applications, none of those points of reading gave the impression to capture the essence of things. What appears to be the essence is that computers square measure merely attempting to more the goals of their homeowners. While such behavior is the bread and butter of economic science and theory of games, it was definitely new for Computer Scientists[8]. Therefore, the rational modeling of participants was adopted into computational settings and Mechanism design was embraced as a paradigm for the planning of distributed computational protocols over the internet. Mechanism design will be thought of as a type of algorithmic program design, however where the entities activity the inputs has a stake within the outcome[9]. As a result, the procedures produced ought to ideally be incentive-compatible, that means that it's in every agent's best interest to report in truth or to otherwise act in a well-behaved manner, and agents cannot gain a plus by misrepresenting their values or "gaming" the system[10]. Several of the issues facing web, for example, like inappropriate hogging of information measure, email spam, and internet spam, will usually best be viewed as issues within the mechanism: the results of imperfections within the incentive structure of the internet. Unfortunately, having to upset the incentives of the varied participants in an exceeding system makes the planning of fine mechanisms extremely troublesome, particularly in advanced or non-static environments[11].

This paper tend to aim to use techniques from machine learning and on-line algorithms to assist manage this complexness. In our past work, we've got shown however machine learning methods are often accustomed cut back mechanism style issues to straightforward algorithmic queries in an exceedingly wide variety of revenue-maximizing auction settings,[12] and that this paper has shown however adaptive algorithms are often developed to handle incentive problems in auctions for dynamic environments. In our proposed work this paper will widen these connections, further developing the relationships between machine learning and mechanism design.

II MODERN APPLICATION

Modern applications usually involve the net which frequently encourages strategic behavior by the users because of its suburbanized nature[13]. Also, fashionable applications in the social, economic, or business domain invariably involve people and organizations that have their own self-interests and act strategically. To form these modern applications perform as supposed in spite of the presence of strategic users in the system, one may use inventive techniques offered by game theory and mechanism design as an area of system design[14]. This explains the second trend that has pushed scientific theory and mechanism style to the forefront. To drive home the point that scientific theory has tested crucial for advancing the present art in trendy-day drawback determination[15].

Since the 1990s, two related threads have catapulted game theory to the middle stage of problem-solving in present. The primary thread is the emergence of theoretical research areas at the interface of game theory and varied subjects like computer science, network science, and other engineering sciences[12]. The second thread is that the natural and infrequently compelling use of game theory in exciting new applications in the net era. within the epoch, game theory has become a key ingredient for solving issues in areas as various as electronic commerce and business, Internet

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advertising, social network analysis and monetization, wireless networks, intelligent transportation, sensible grids, and carbon footprint optimization. This paper tend to deal with a few relevant current trends and modern applications[7].

II.I Matching markets

This is a standard drawback setting that continues to give exciting new applications in the present in addition. Matching is the method of allocating one set of resources or people to a different set of resources or individuals. Examples include matching buyers to sellers in a market; matching resources to tasks; matching new doctors to hospitals; matching job-seeking engineers to firms, and matching students to colleges (see Figure 1)[16]. There are examples with a deep social impact like matching kidneys to patients (or generally organ donors to organ recipients). Such matching issues are generally classified into wedding problems and house allocation problems[17]. During a marriage problem, the resources on every side of the market have preferences over the resources on the opposite aspect. In house allocation, only resources on one in all the edges have preferences over the resources on the opposite aspect. In either case, the matching needs to be accomplished in order that the individual preferences are honored or performance is optimized[12].



Fig. 1: A matching market

Two key needs of any solution to the matching drawback are stability and incentive compatibility. Informally, an answer is alleged to be stable if the answer cannot become strictly higher through a reallocation[18]. An answer is named incentive-compatible if the preferences are reported in truth by all the agents. The theory of games has been used to analyze in an exceedingly rigorous manner each stability and incentive compatibility. Since the Sixties, the theory of games and game theorists have contributed vastly to the event of a comprehensive theory of matching markets. The

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existence of an oversized range of productive matching markets in real-world applications is one of the numerous successes of a theory of games[19].

Matching markets have many socially important applications such as competitive matching of colleges with students and hospitals with interns, leading to the maximization of social welfare. They have also saved precious human lives through the better and faster matching of kidneys and human organs[20]. Theory of game and mechanism design have played a significant role in ensuring the success of these markets.

II.II Social Network Analysis

Social networks are currently present and are helpful for several applications as well as information diffusion, electronic business, and search. Social network analysis is central to various Internet-based applications,[21] as an example, viral promoting, influence maximization, and influence limitation that is supported by social networks. Existing methods and tools for social network analysis has a lacuna: they are doing not capture the behavior (such as rationality and intelligence) of individual nodes nor do they model the strategic interactions that occur among these nodes[22]. Game theory may be a natural tool to beat this inadequacy since it provides rigorous mathematical models of strategic interaction among autonomous, intelligent, and rational agents that type the nodes of a social network. The books by Jackson and Easley and Kleinberg emphasize the employment of game theory in finding out many social network analysis problems like predicting the topologies of social networks, modeling data diffusion, etc.[23]



Fig. 2: Influential nodes in a social network

Theory of game provides a suitable approach to designing scalable algorithms for social network analysis. Mechanism design has proved valuable in the area of social network monetization. Numerous applications using social networks have emerged in recent times which have been enabled by the use of game theory and mechanism design[24].

III CONCLUSION

In this article, we've got given an introduction to the applying of the theory of games and mechanism design to programming models. Thereby we've got chosen to limit the scope of models and techniques to be able to present the foremost important techniques in detail. This paper tends to see many avenues of research departing from this

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introduction. Within the narrow scope of this article, the foremost promising analysis queries appear to us related to mechanism design within the presence of multi-dimensional varieties, wherever the type space is totally unrestricted, that means that each agent will have any valuation for every of the outcomes, solely Affine maximizers' area unit honestly implementable, for allocation algorithms that satisfy some further properties, it might show that during this specific case this paper tend to cannot do higher than using an Affine maximizer if this paper would like to ensure honesty. This is able to indicate that additionally during this case affine maximizers' area unit the sole honestly implementable algorithms. Wherever job agents' ways are a combination of machine decisions and kind revelation, and additionally, agents arrive online, it appears to be troublesome to produce mechanisms that area unit truthful and at the same time has a decent performance. It might be interesting to explore how far this paper is able to get with truthful mechanisms.

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