Regional Head to Overcome Corruption Strategy in Indonesia

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Abstract--_This study aims to examine the phenomenon of corruption that occurs in the regions, especially the Regional Head Operations (OTT) of corruption by the KPK which is quite alarming after decentralization as stipulated in Law No. 23/2014 Regional Government and Law No. 33 of 2004 concerning Regional Central Fiscal Balance. The elections that are intended to produce the best leaders in their regions by direct and open elections actually give birth to troubled leaders who betray the people's mandate. The method used in the activity is a descriptive method through a qualitative approach. With this method and approach, it is expected to be able to describe various problems in their entirety and comprehensively, so that the results of the problem analysis can be used as a basis for understanding phenomena and giving birth to a concept of preventing and controlling corruption of regional heads. Considering that many cases of regional head corruption occur, the perspective must not be seen as mere incidental and human error, but it is a fundamental and comprehensive system error, so it must be improved systematically starting from the recruitment, process and procedure of the local elections to the authority of the elected regional head._

Key words--_Corruption, Autonomous Region, the Regional Head._

I. INTRODUCTION

Decentralization in various parts of the world in general is based on the assumption that the quality of public administration and public service delivery will be improved through changes in policy-making and accountability are close to a community. Decentralization includes the distribution of power from the central to the local community that is assumed to have an influence on the substance and quality of public administration and social services. Proponents of decentralization so trusting that gives power and authority will produce a responsive government and to gain knowledge, creativity, and initiative of each element in the area. Thus, the government closer to becoming a need for the existing conditions,

Administrative decentralization is intended to redistribute authority, responsibility and financial resources in order to provide public services to the various levels of government. Delegation of this responsibility includes planning, financing and management of various public services from the central government and the implementing agencies to the various units of government at various levels (regional authorities). Implementation of administrative decentralization was based on an argument that the management of the public service units would be more effective if delivered to the unit in direct contact with the public. The assumption is that the closer the relationship between the government (region) with the community, the more understandable community needs a service. In other words,

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administrative decentralization is intended to create efficiency and effectiveness of public services. Such characteristics by TA Legowo seen as decentralization aimed at discouraging pragmatic because it has political or override variable.

Autonomy is a political bid for the changes and development of society is accelerating toward independence (self-determination) or the distribution of the balance of power and authority of government (sharing of power for governmental) .In turn is expected to create a balance of regional autonomy and political interaction processes to encourage local democratic society (local democratitation) through the empowerment of institutions - political institutions and good governance reforms (Utomo, 1999; Usman, 1999).

But in fact it is inversely proportional to the facts on the ground with decentralized with all power and authority is entirely run by the county many irregularities that occur, often regional head meposisikan himself as "little kings" thus blurring the private sphere and the public, including in financial management so that in many parts of Indonesia head exposed cases of corruption. This is of course very diametric to the initial ideals of regional autonomy has been very good where it is expected Regions able to build and run the government independently suit regional needs itself. But it is precisely in practice, gave space rampant corruption thrives regional heads like mushrooms in the rainy season.

It can not be separated from the political process of the election itself since the registration until the election of regional heads balloon tiring and exhausting, mind and also logistical or political cost is quite large. And a great political cost is not uncommon given the "investor" and successful team that will be charged if elected in various modes and regional projects that rely on the budget so that eventually trapped in the vortex of corruption regional head area. Even if the head area even originally good even with the background of the Islamic party, students or schools even with the current election system can measuk in the vortex of this corruption.

Based on the above description of the background issues, the considered problem is formulated as follows: How weakness Concepts autonomy and political processes that occur lead to a Regional Head of Corruption.

II. METHOD

This study used a qualitative approach. Qualitative approaches are used to obtain information that describes certain patterns, such as patterns of power relations (power) and the authority in the relationship between the implementation of regional autonomy the district / city, with the use of the mechanism of local budgets. In general, according to Patton (1990), qualitative methods allow researchers to conduct a study on a particular issue in depth and detail. The use of a qualitative approach is also adapted to the existing characteristics that the researchers were directly involved in the research area through non participant observation.

III. RESULTS

Autonomous etymologically is a term meaning "stand alone" or "self-governing". While the area is a region or neighborhood pemerintah.Secara terms of regional autonomy is the authority in an area that is set up and manage for the benefit of the region more widely sendiri.Pengertian is power in a region that is set up and manage for the

benefit of the region itself from the economy, political and financial balance settings including setting the social, cultural, and ideological in accordance with the traditions of the local environment mores.

Implementation of regional autonomy is influenced by factors that include the ability of the executive, the ability to finance, availability of tools and materials, and the ability to organize. Regional autonomy does not cover certain areas, such as foreign policy, defense and security, justice, monetary, fiscal, and religion. The Bidangbidang remains a matter for central government.

Decentralization is a means to achieve one purpose of the state, which provides public services better and create public decision-making process more democratic and fast. Desentralisasiakan embodied in the delegation of authority to the levels of government for spending authority to levy a tax (taxing power), the formation of the Board elected by the people, elected by the Regional Head of the Regional, and their assistance equalization funds from the Central Government. Decentralization is the delegation of authority in making decisions and policies to the manager or the people who are at lower levels in the organization structure.

Thus regulation is instrumental in supporting the implementation of regional autonomy. Decentralization should be implemented sebaikbaiknya by harnessing all available resources. Therefore, in order to give birth to the regulations that are not problematic regulations designer should be able to understand the meaning of regional autonomy in their entirety.

Regional autonomy is basically the rights, powers and obligations of the regions to set up and manage their own household. The rights acquired through the delivery of government affairs of the central government to local governments in accordance with the circumstances and the ability of local autonomy and decentralization is concerned.

Regional autonomy as a form of dianutnya asasdesentralisasi, is expected to be able to provide a service that terbaikkepada community. Because of the authority received by the Regional melaluiadanya Autonomous Region, will give the "freedom" to the Regions. In terms of the various actions that are expected to be in accordance with the aspirations of the people in the region kondisiserta.

The presumption is logically due to Local Government closer to the people, so it would be more to know what the demands and wishes of the New Order era masyarakat.Pada implementation of decentralization and demokratisasikurang succeed. When entering the reform era, many people believe that in this era will be a change towards more democratic at all levels and aspects of society. An era dimanaberbagai major changes to the governance of this nation's social and political life banyakdilakukan. New Order products deemed incompatible with this changing kondisimasyarakat later changed or even eliminated altogether, including the various regulations and laws.

1. Common Terminology About Corruption

In general, several theories describe corruption as any behavior involving abuse or misuse of public office, power, or resources for personal benefit. Literature sometimes distinguish between types of corruption in the political segment, the bureaucracy and the economy; yet practical, three-dimensional typology is only distinguish the perpetrators of the same conduct. All manifestations of corruption motivated by the desire to use the devices and facilities of power / authority for personal, family, and other groups. In Law No. 31 1999 Jo Act No. 20 of 2001, Chapter II, Article 2, stated that the definition of corruption is: "Any person who acts unlawfully enrich themselves or another person or a corporation that could harm the state finance and economy of the country." In line with this concept, Shah and Schacter berpendapat8, corruption includes three types of broad categories: (a) 'grand corruption', ie when officials commit theft or misuse of public resources on a large scale; (B) 'state capture' or 'regulatory capture', namely collusion reciprocal conducted by government agencies and the private sector for personal gain; and (c) 'bureaucratic corruption' or 'petty corruption', namely the involvement of public officials at a lower level in the abuse of office to obtain a bribe or a small profit. Corruption at the level of grand corruption and state capture is corruption intentional, premeditated, large scale, and involves many parties from upstream to downstream. Corruption of this type usually performed by a swarm of political elites or senior government officials who make policy or rules to benefit themselves and certain groups by allowing them to abuse the large amounts of revenue and public facilities as well as getting kickbacks from national and transnational companies. Meanwhile, the 'state capture' or 'regulatory capture', is the corruption that is done by utilizing the facilities, rules or existing resources, without having to plan from upstream. While the 'bureaucratic corruption' is the corruption at the level of the lowest administration. This is usually done by civil servants who became executor of government policy. This kind of corruption usually occurs in titikpertukaran between civil servants and citizens or to whom they provide public services directly. For example, occur at the immigration service, the police, hospitals, tax, school, or the licensing authority. In addition, the definition of corruption can also be done from the perspective of the context of analysis used. Perspective can be grouped into three: public-office-centered, market-centered, and public interest-centered, The theory of public-office-centered, describe corruption as behavioral deviations from the norm duties of public officials or violation of the rules to serve personal interests, including bribery, nepotism and misappropriation. While the market-centered theory, describing corruption as the abuse of office by public officials to monopolize their office and the process of making policies (such as taxes, subsidies, even privatization) as a means of maximizing their own interests. While the public interest-centered theory, defines corruption as the act of an authority that privileging anyone who gives rewards and thus undermine the principle of equality (equality) in the service of the general public.

It is not surprising that, in a democracy, politicians have a strong incentive to use policy tools to influence the preferences of voters when the election is getting closer. But the problem that is only limited by the literature discussed in the political budget cycle is the media's role in this strategy, which is driven by user preferences and ideological stance media. The literature on the political economy of the media so far have discussed a number of dimensions in which the media can operate an ideological choice: issues to be discussed, the specific aspects of the problem to be highlighted or excluded, how the facts are presented and discussed and a reliable source. In this work

we add to the literature to investigate the existence of ideological bias in news coverage of political prominence, ie news about the corruption that is triggered by the election cycle. Our empirical analysis is based on the original database that contains all the articles produced by the most important Italian newspapers about the corruption scandal related to public health care in the region of Italy during the period 2005-2014. News about corruption in the health service has a high value for the regional elections in Italy, because health spending is the largest part of local budgets and health expenditure clearly caused by the local government. Our results - obtained by focusing on a newspaper which is also characterized by a clear ideological stance, La Repubblica and Il Giornale, respectively - are oriented at right - supports the existence of 'biased election cycle' partisan news coverage of corruption scandals. by Il Giornale and La Repubblica. As the election nears, newspapers increase the number of daily articles about the episode involving politicians from opposing political orientation, while they reduce the number of those that do not involve politicians, de facto reducing news coverage of corruption.

Unfortunately, due to the reduced number of observations available, we here can not identify the impact it may have on election results detected bias for both newspapers. Nonetheless, anecdotal evidence about the case ended with the resignation of the governor which shows that corruption is very prominent news to voters. In Lombardy, the distribution of voting for right-wing coalition declined from 56.11 percent in 2010 - before the scandal involving Mr. Formigoni - became 42.81 per cent in 2013. The right-wing coalition still has a majority, but the new governor was revealed. by various parties in the coalition. In addition, the sound distribution of parties supporting Mr Formigoni is reduced by half, from 31.79% in 2010 to 16% in 2013. Three Dimensions of Corruption by (Rose Ackermen, 1999): Corruption in the economic dimension he thinks stems from symptoms that are wrong in the management of the State, where the institutions designed to regulate relations between the population would be used to enrich themselves and gain additional profit for the corrupt.

In the cultural dimension, described corruption as a tradition of giving a bribe, gift / gifts. Price and administration by another person called a corrupt act, but for the culture of a society is regarded as the habit of giving gifts or gratuities reasonable that made it legal.

In the political dimension, corruption is described as the corrupt behavior of actors in the running relationship between the State by the private sector. Sometimes a State officer who became the dominant; sometimes the most nerkuasa private actors. More broadly describes corruption as the abuse of power for personal gain.

Characteristics of Regional Head indication of corruption affect the characteristics of the head of the region consisting of the incumbent status, education level, age affects the indication of corruption. Requirements for someone who will run for local office were expected to consider these factors in setting head of the region is an important consideration in the drafting of the rules relating to budgeting, administration, implementation and accountability of capital expenditure capital expenditure is not a land of local leaders in political campaign financing in the general election of regional heads.

2. Relation of Corruption, Capitalism and Democracy

Girling (John Girling: 1997) describes the theoretical position regarding the relationship between corruption, capitalism, and democracy. With reference to the thesis of Lord Acton, Girling stated that democracy could actually reduce the likelihood of corruption. In connection with that, corruption occurs because it is also supported by legal procedures. Overlap occurs between capitalism and democracy led to the definition of what is public and private is blurred. Girling emphasize his thesis that corruption generated by the clash between democracy and capitalism. 'Power corruption' or 'corruption of power,' for example, occur as a result of misuse of public interest for the benefit of the private.

This is only possible when the political and economic system prevailing closely intertwined, but also conflict. In this case, capitalism and democracy in this case, capitalism and democracy did have raison de'etre are different from each other. Raison d'être democracy is to serve the public interest, while the base of capitalism is the pursuit of personal gain. However, they should conspire to make this system work. The penetration of capitalism, of market values into a democratic political system into conditions conducive to corruption. These conditions make the practice of money politics, party financing or electoral candidates by the company, and of course corruption, becomes inevitable.

Girling pointed out, in the election for example, someone who followed the election to accumulate capital which he issued when following the election, when he held political office. That is what happened in many countries, including Indonesia and the Philippines. The high cost of electoral contestation as one of the potential causes of corruption, also occurred in the United States (US).

In this case the factors that led to the system and the concept of regional autonomy has its drawbacks namely: *cost Politics* in Indonesia is not high compared with income of Regional Head of post sworn in as Head of the Region so that when in office of some cases of corruption that ensnared the head of the Regional political capital back to cover the cost of politics during the campaign, Election Costs in Indonesia is expensive. In Election 2009, the campaign cost a presidential candidate (candidates) could reach Rp 1.5 trillion, and nearly half of the budget is only used for publicity and promotion. Meanwhile, legislative candidates (candidates) have to spend too little.

In his dissertation, entitled Communication Legislative Politics and the Making of the constituents, Pramono Agung, members of the House of PDIP, indicating that the candidate has been popular still requires a minimum fund Rp600 million, while the candidate from among entrepreneurs typically spent $ 6 billion. In addition, there is the possibility of the costs of candidates for the 2014 election will go up. It is related to the ratio of costs to be incurred by a candidate in elections in 2004 and 2009 where the cost incurred a candidate for the 2009 elections was much larger 3.5-fold from the 2004 elections.

Long-term political survival depends on how successful politicians in creating a network of interdependent interests with companies digger rents where electoral support interchangeable with lucrative procurement contracts. Empirical part confirms non-linear relationship between corruption and re-election, in which the possibility of re-election is maximized for about one fifth of all procurement allocated in a way that potentially fraudulent. When

about half of all procurement is allocated in this way, a mayor, on average, lost the election. Therefore, voters were punishing the corrupt behavior, but only when corruption is too rampant and too obvious. Even farther, Positive effects of corruption on the re-election mostly working in small towns and medium with little oversight and accountability is low. For large cities, estimates the impact of corruption on re-election is negative, and therefore confirms the overall non-linear effects.

The methodological contribution seeks to provide a blueprint for researchers to move away from the perception index and try and find the size of the corruption that is stronger and more precise. It is based on the recent literature that tries to do the same to gain access to a much better dataset on public procurement (Fazekas et al., 2016; Ferwerda et al., 2017; Fazekas and Kocsis, 2017). Even with such efforts are always concerns do type I errors (false encode regular procurement as suspicious). In addition, only use procurement contracts may also underestimate the overall level of corruption. There are various other corrupt activities that tend to be carried out by local governments, such as convert agricultural land into residential land, or change local laws to support partial interest. All these practices also show the close relationship between the local political elite and local excavation company rents, but they are much more difficult to quantify and measure than the procurement contract. Future research efforts should also lead to this direction, in addition to producing a better effort in identifying corruption in public procurement.

Finally, the normative implications can be drawn from the main results of this paper, specially for Croatian electoral framework analyzed in the paper. The suggestion is to introduce electoral rules limit the terms for a maximum of two terms. Two-term incumbent (a total of eight years) is often enough for a politician to create a strong network of which it can pick up the rents. Research on the effects of term limits on political behavior (ie. Besley, 2006; Ferraz and Finan, 2011) have found that politicians steal more in the last and final term of them, knowing that they will lose positions with certainty. However, because it has no period of limitation arguably worse than local communities making them dependent on interpersonal relationships between the strong interest and political elite, it is important to first reduce the political power. In the case of term limits local government recognition is the first step towards achieving that goal.

3. Potential weaknesses Corruption Concept Of Regional Autonomy Regional Head

Regional autonomy program is not followed by a democratization program which opens opportunities for public involvement in local government. Therefore, this decentralization program only provide opportunities for local elites to access sources of economic and political areas, which are prone to corruption or abuse of authority.

Secondly, there is no state institution that is able to effectively control deviation authority in the area. Regional autonomy program has cut the hierarchical structure of government, so it is no longer effective central government control to the area because there is no structural connection directly enforce compliance of local governments to the central government. Regional heads, governors, regents and mayors, is no longer determined by the central government, but by the mechanism of the local elections by the Parliament and responsible to the Parliament. Central and local government relations function only, ie only the power to give policy guidance to local authorities.

Third, the legislature failed in its function as control institution. Quite the opposite occurred in close collusion between local governments and legislators so that control of the operation do not occur as local government, while the control of the civil society is still weak. Which needs to be underlined that the control institutions such as Parliament that the constitution should supervise the policies of the executive (Local Government) does not mean the possibility of corruption and become lost. Precisely when collusion occurs between the executive and legislature, it is very difficult for people to exercise control over both institutions are therefore autonomous communities are not realized. Against mass corruption phenomena occurring, especially in the era of decentralization actually can not be separated from the bureaucratic model in Indonesia. Richard Robinson (1986) as cited Anang Arief Susanto said that this kind of bureaucracy in Indonesia is a patrimonial bureaucracy so the practice of corruption by the bureaucracy difficult to control, Patrimonial culture is not very conducive to a culture of critical thinking and reflective. It is given that the bureaucracy since the 70's by Soeharto used as an instrument of social and political control.

Politicization of bureaucracy deliberately created as a source of polling at election time as well as to control and ensure the loyalty of "ideology" of the bureaucracy of the government. Although it has been implemented decentralization, no change in the position, character, perspective and orientation of the bureaucracy makes corruption increasingly fertile.

Corruption in Indonesia has reached the nadir. Corruption in this country is so severe, deep-rooted, even already entrenched. Corrupt practices occur almost every layer of bureaucracy, the legislature, executive and judiciary, and has also spread to the business world. Corruption not only would undermine the state structure is slowly, but destroy all important joints contained in the State.

This was reflected in the corruption perception index issued by some survey organizations, such as the Corruption Perception Index (Corruption Perception Index) issued by Transparency International and Politically and Economic Risk Consultancy (PERC), survey conducted by Transparency International showed Indonesia's score is very low and no significant increase until 2013. PERC even put Indonesia into a corrupt country in Asia Pacific in 2009 and 2010. in fact, since 2004 until 2019 there were 124 cases of corruption entangled Regional Head of the start of Governors, Mayors, and Regents.

Thus corruption cases arguably is no longer centralized but spreads to remote areas when matters of law and combating corruption is still stagnant, then the people's welfare and social justice will never really materialized. Although the 1998 reform agenda successfully overthrow the regime which was considered severe in terms of corruption, but it does not mean that today Indonesia successfully completed or cleared of corruption.

However, it is precisely at this time can be said to be more severe. In the New Order era corruption conducted after the policy and the realization of the current budget, but now since the law or government policy discussed already causing corruption, and the time of implementation. Of course you can imagine, what in the realization, just how the budget until the target However, until now the eradication of corruption continue to be pursued. It appears the issue of law enforcement itself is still dominated by old men who served since the New Order era.

As a result, every time there is an attempt prosecution of corruption cases, the investigating authorities made a counter terrorized by those who want to be dealt with regional autonomy that was supposed to be a bridge towards decentralization of development policies and institutions to combat corruption. Indonesia has had sufficient comprehensiveness related to eradicating corruption systematically, including the bureaucracy in the public service sector.

Though Indonesia has had a MPR Decree No. XI / MPR / 1998 regarding the State Clean and Free of Corruption, Collusion and Nepotism (KKN) and Law No. 28 of 1999 on the Implementation of the State were clean and free of corruption. UU no. 31 1999 Jo. UU no. 20 of 2001 on the Eradication of Corruption, Law No. 30 of 2002 on Eradication Commission korupsinyata, it is a great opportunity for corruption in these areas.

From the above explanation can be concluded that the cases of corruption allegedly committed by the head of the region is still relatively high. This is supported by the statement of the Interior Minister, Tjahjo Kumolo highlighting many regional heads who lodged a legal case. Based on data from the Interior Ministry, there are 343 regional head litigant law both in the judiciary, police, and the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK). Mostly due to snagging problems of financial management. "The latest data until December 2015 has been relatively high, governors, regents, mayors are 343 people who are good legal problems in the judiciary, police, KPK. Data from the Ministry of Interior said that until the year 2010, there were 206 regional heads who lodged a legal case. The next year, Kemendagri routinely noted that 40 heads of regions (in 2011), 41 heads of regions (2012), and 23 regional head (2013). (Kompas.com: 2015).

This data further confirms the hypothesis that regional autonomy is only giving monopoly power to local government (Regional Head and the Legislature) to manage economic resources which are prone to misuse because of the absence of intervening factors that functionally have the power control of the two institutions. The intervening factor is the strength of organized society in the region In particular based on discussions with the Commission researchers, who carried out TPK Regional Head No 4, namely:

1. TPK in the procurement of goods / services financed APBN / APBD, as many as 14 cases
2. TPK in the misuse of funds, a total of 22 cases
3. TPK in the licensing of natural resources that are not in accordance with the provisions, as many as six cases.
4. TPK Acceptance of bribes, a total of 24 cases.

From the results of the research have revealed factors that cause the head area of corruption, among others:

First, monopoly power. Based on interviews with several informants about monopoly power concluded that the head of the region has enormous power in the management of local budget, recruitment of local officials, the granting of natural resources, procurement and rulemaking head of the region, and their dynasty rule, it causes the head area of corruption through bribery and gratuities

Second, the policy Discretion. Based on statements from informants that discretion attached to public officials, particularly the head region, meaning discretion in doing because not all covered in the regulations so that the necessary policies to decide something, so that what is targeted that can be met without having to wait for the rules

is available, the problem then discretion is understood very broadly, but discretion was very limited, he can only be given space when there are no rules and that the situation is urgent, the budget is the basis of financial management in a budget year that is a plan for the implementation of Revenue and Expenditure in the framework of the implementation of decentralization in a particular fiscal year.

Similarly, regional spending and the bond that burden the region in the implementation of decentralization carried out according to the number and the targets set in the budget. In the implementation of regional heads are often faced with the reality to finance an activity that is not budgeted in the budget. Informant 1 describes the situation in which the head area the cost is nothing in the budget, so the head of the area looking for loopholes to create fictitious expenses to cover these costs so that the head of the region tends to corruption in the interests of agencies and for private purposes.

Third, Weak Accountability. Collusion in the Executive and Legislative Policy Making the corruptive. In an interview with the informant stated conditions at the moment of collusion between the head region with Parliament related to the policies made by the head of the region, for example the problem of making regulations and perijinan.termasuk in a lack of accountability is his lack of transparency in budget management, asset management and in the procurement of goods and services, thereby causing the head area of corruption.

Fourth, LainyaBeberapa factor causative factor other regional heads of corruption partly because the direct election costs are expensive, lack of competence in the area of financial management, less pahamnya regulations, and the understanding of the concept of culture is wrong. Of the several factors causing corruption in the upper head region, need to make prevention and effective supervision is to improve guidance to SPIP in local government. BPK as Trustees SPIP has the program and coaching SPIP, in cooperation with the Commission, has made the prevention of corruption. BPK has been cooperating with law enforcement agencies in the prevention and control of corruption, but the results are not optimal, so that should be improved in the future.

Although intervening factors referred TA Legowo not yet fully formed, but the look of the common symptoms seen in the work of demolition case korupsidi area, it can be said that the seeds for the formation of the power of non-state control are emerging.

IV. CONCLUSION

Finally, Corruption is happening today in Indonesia has been greatly at alarming phase where regional autonomy has become a nest of corruption the head area with several cases of arrest of the head area in some cities and districts in Indonesia. Corruption is no longer the case in the center but has spread to regions due to a weak autonomy of the region itself, there must be some that had to be straightened with a clear legal framework in the area so that corruption can be minimized, One of the reasons the political system in Indonesia clearly has political costs are very high impact on the current elected regional heads there are some regional heads who had been a suspect they no longer think of the public interest but the interests of political parties and become material for political capital back to restore the political costs at the time before the elected head of the region, and the above described that it is not only the regional head of the suspected corruption but from the level of bureaucracy and

councilors in the area becomes suspect. This is further explained on the case that many of the weaknesses in the concept of regional autonomy in Indonesia. and the above described that it is not only the regional head of the suspected corruption but from the level of bureaucracy and councilors in the area becomes suspect. This is further explained on the case that many of the weaknesses in the concept of regional autonomy in Indonesia. and the above described that it is not only the regional head of the suspected corruption but from the level of bureaucracy and councilors in the area becomes suspect. This is further explained on the case that many of the weaknesses in the concept of regional autonomy in Indonesia.

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